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by D. Dunthorn (Author)
After fascism's defeat in 1945 Britain did not co-operate with Franco's Spanish opponents to end his dictatorship. This study demonstrates how divisions in the Spanish opposition were one factor but argues that Britain's strategic and commercial interests in Spain also acted as a disincentive. Only when international pressure for sanctions threatened Iberian stability in 1947 did the British government turn to the Spanish opposition. With the advent of the Cold War, however, the opposition became irrelevant to British needs and Franco's survival was guaranteed.
Author Biography
DAVID DUNTHORN is Visiting Lecturer for Modern European History at the University of the West of England, Bristol. He graduated from Cambridge University in 1964 with an Honours Degree in Modern and Medieval languages. Having gained a Post-Graduate Certificate of Education he then taught French, Spanish and German in secondary schools in England and abroad for almost thirty years. He is co-editor (with Dr Christian Leitz) of Spain in an International Context, 1936-1959, and has had an article based on his doctoral research published in European History Quarterly.
